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We describe a patient with severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) whose clinical symptoms were masked
by Escherichia coli bacteremia. SARS developed in a clus-
ter of healthcare workers who had contact with this patient.
SARS was diagnosed when a chest infiltrate developed
and when the patient’s brother was hospitalized with acute
respiratory failure. We highlight problems in atypical cases
and offer infection control suggestions.  
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly
recognized condition. In early March 2003, the World
Health Organization (WHO) issued case definitions for
SARS (1). In most studies, the clinical syndrome includes
fever in 100% of patients (2–4). Other common clinical
features include chills and rigors (73%), myalgia (60%),
and cough (>50%). Some patients initially thought to have
SARS have been excluded when tests showed other caus-
es (5). We report a patient whose coexisting conditions
masked the diagnosis of SARS, leading to a cluster of sus-
pect and probable cases. 
Case Report
A59-year-old Chinese man was admitted on March 24,
2003, to the Singapore General Hospital. He had previous-
ly been hospitalized in Tan Tock Seng Hospital, the hospi-
tal in which the first SARS outbreak in Singapore occurred
(6), from March 5 to March 20 for diabetic nephropathy. 
The patient had multiple coexisting conditions includ-
ing ischemic heart disease with atrial fibrillation, previous
stroke with scar epilepsy, diabetes mellitus with nephropa-
thy (creatinine 242 µmol/L), and peripheral vascular dis-
ease. He was not on steroids or traditional medications. 
Clinical signs and symptoms were melena and dizzi-
ness. He was pale, temperature was 36.5°C, blood pressure
was 126/70 mm Hg, and pulse rate was 110/min. Chest
examination was normal, and the abdomen was soft.
Rectal examination showed melena. The patient also had a
sloughy right heel ulcer. Laboratory values are shown in
the Table. Antral gastritis was diagnosed on gastroscopy.
Colonoscopy and barium enema were unsuccessful
because of excessive fecal residue. 
The patient had a temperature spike (38.4°C) on March
26, and intravenous (IV) amoxicillin/clavulanic acid was
started. His temperature spiked again (38.8°C) on March
28. The source of sepsis was thought to be the necrotic heel
ulcer; wound débridement was performed on March 30.
The fever persisted from March 28 until April 2. Blood
cultures drawn on March 28 isolated E. coli of intermedi-
ate sensitivity to amoxicillin/clavulanic acid. Further eval-
uation for the source of bacteremia included urinalysis,
which indicated a leukocyte count of 4 and erythrocyte
count of 165. Ultrasonography showed a 2.8-cm abscess at
the midpole of the right kidney. Urine culture yielded
mixed bacteria growth. The patient’s medication was
changed to IV ceftriaxone (to which the organism was sus-
ceptible) on April 1. Tissue cultures from the necrotic heel
yielded  Pseudomonas aeruginosa sensitive only to
imipenem. Although fever was lower after 1 day of ceftri-
axone, the patient’s medication was switched to IV
imipenem on April 2. He remained afebrile thereafter.
On April 1 (6 days after the patient’s first spike of tem-
perature), three healthcare workers from the ward into
which he had first been admitted became febrile. At this
time, physicians were notified that the patient was on a
surveillance program for SARS. He was transferred from
the general surgical ward to an isolation room, and health-
care workers used a combination of airborne, contact, and
droplet precautions. His clinical course was scrutinized for
evidence of SARS. Despite the positive contact history, he
did not have any respiratory symptoms. Three chest x-rays
performed on days 1, 5, and 7 of hospitalization were nor-
mal (Figure 1A, B, and C). The fever could have been
attributed to the E. coli bacteremia because it subsided
after the patient’s antimicrobial drug was changed to an
appropriate one. Over the subsequent days, 16 healthcare
workers from the two wards where this patient was treated
became febrile. 
On day 11 of hospitalization (April 3, 14days after the
patient’s last day in Tan Tock Seng Hospital), an ill-
defined air space shadow was noted in the right lower zone
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*Singapore General Hospital, Singaporeof his chest x-ray (Figure 2). On May 5, he was transferred
back to Tan Tock Seng Hospital, an officially designated
SARS hospital. The patient had no further temperature
spikes and no respiratory symptoms, despite the chest x-
ray abnormalities. Respiratory distress did not develop,
and neither methylprednisolone nor ribavirin was given.
The patient completed a course of imipenem but remains
in hospital at the time of writing because of nosocomial
sepsis. On April 8, his brother was also admitted to Tan
Tock Seng Hospital for acute respiratory failure and died. 
Throat swabs from our patient were collected on April
4 and stool samples were collected on April 10, days 9 and
15 after the onset of fever, respectively. These samples
were sent for viral studies that included virus isolation and
reverse transcriptase–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)
for the SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). Three
sets of primers were used. The first two sets were
SAR1S/As and BNIoutS2/As as described in the paper by
Drosten et al. (7); the third primer set was Cor1/2 (5'-CAC
CGT TTC TAC AGG TTA GCT AAC GA-3' and 5'-AAA
TGT TTA CGC AGG TAA GCC TAA AA-3') from the
Government Virus Unit, Hong Kong. 
From the throat swab, a weak band measuring 310 bp
was found by using the Cor1/2 primer set only. Positive
bands were seen with all three primer sets on the stool
sample; the bands with the SAR1S/As and BNIoutS2/As
primers measured 190 and 150 bp, respectively. 
The diagnosis of SARS in the patient’s brother was sub-
sequently confirmed on April 9 when a throat swab was
positive for SARS-CoV by PCR. Multiple postmortem
samples were also positive for SARS-CoV by PCR, and
SARS-CoV was also isolated in the lung tissue.
Serum samples from the patient and the healthcare
workers who were his contacts were tested for total anti-
bodies to SARS-CoV with an enzyme immunoassay by
using SARS-CoV Vero E6 cell lysate that had been devel-
oped by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Results of serologic testing were positive at day 41. Serum
samples were taken from 14 of the 16 healthcare workers
at least 21 days after onset of symptoms. Of these, 13 were
positive for antibodies to SARS-CoV. 
Extensive epidemiologic studies identified this patient
as the common source for the cluster of healthcare work-
ers in Singapore General Hospital who were subsequently
diagnosed with SARS. These healthcare workers were
infected before chest infiltrates developed and the patient
was isolated. 
A total of 16 healthcare workers (13 nurses, one health
attendant, one radiographer, and one doctor), 12 patients,
and eight visitors (including his brother) from the wards in
which the patient was admitted were eventually diagnosed
with probable SARS. In addition, he was linked to a clus-
ter of five healthcare workers (one radiographer and four
health attendants), one visitor, and three outpatients at the
diagnostic radiology department where he had barium
studies and an ultrasound performed.
Epidemiologic evidence suggested that this patient was
the source for this cluster. He was linked to one of the
index cases in Tan Tock Seng Hospital, had the earliest
onset of fever among the cohort of Singapore General
Hospital probable cases, and was the only infected patient
who had been in the two wards during the relevant time
period. In addition, all the nurses infected had been
assigned to care for him during the incubation period of
their illness. Strong supportive evidence that could not oth-
erwise be explained by contact with other patients comes
from the cluster from radiology department.
Conclusions
We present this case to highlight the diagnostic as well
as public health problems posed by a patient with a rather
atypical SARS, whose illness was easily explained by a
positive blood culture. Classically, SARS is described as
an illness with an incubation of 2 to 7 days followed by a
prodrome of high fever with headache, malaise, and myal-
gia. At the onset of the illness, some patients have mild res-
piratory symptoms. After 3 to 7 days, a lower respiratory
phase with nonproductive cough or dyspnea begins (8).
Although the clinical signs and symptoms in otherwise
healthy persons are widely known, the full clinical spec-
trum is not known. 
In the study by Lee et al., 78% of patients had abnormal
chest radiographs at the onset of fever (4). Peiris et al.
350 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 10, No. 2, February 2004
EMERGENCE OF SARS
Table. Laboratory results for SARS patient
a 
Characteristic  March 24  March 25  March 28  March 30 
Hemoglobin (g/dL)  5.6  7.5  9.4  10.9 
Leukocyte count (x10
9/L)  11.3  8.99  8.39  10.07 
Polymorphs (%)  79.3  83.0  77.3  81.4 
Lymphocytes (%)  11.4  8.1  14.3  13.8 
Monocytes (%)  8.1  5.3  8.2  4.5 
Eosinophils (%)  1.1  0.6  0.1  0.1 
Basophils (%)  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.2 
Platelets (x10
9/L)  421  459  332  286 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. reported that all their patients had radiologic evidence of
consolidation at admission (9). In another study of 10
cases, 9 had abnormal chest x-ray results (3). A Canadian
study reported that two of nine patients had subtle chest
radiographs. Repeat chest x-rays were read as normal in
these two patients (2). Without radiographic abnormalities,
the diagnosis of SARS can be difficult, especially if a
cause for fever exists. By the time the radiographs became
abnormal in our patient, he had infected healthcare work-
ers. The implications of such a case and its consequences
on the practice of medicine are important, even in current
SARS-free areas because of world travel.
Although we are taught to apply Occam’s razor and
search for a unifying diagnosis, multiple coexisting condi-
tions are a part of clinical medicine. SARS can coexist
with other febrile illnesses. The combination of atypical
signs and symptoms and a coexisting diagnosis can have
negative public health implications.
Close contact is defined by WHO as having cared for or
lived with a SARS patient or having had direct contact
with respiratory secretions and body fluids of a SARS
patient. This contact history is often difficult to determine
and quantify. In one case, the only “contact” elucidated
was passing through an emergency department of a hospi-
tal with a SARS outbreak (10). We are not the first group
to have seen atypical SARS in a patient with multiple
coexisting conditions (10). 
In a SARS outbreak, we suggest that all patients with
undifferentiated fever or pneumonia be cared for as if they
had SARS for the safety of healthcare workers and
patients, implying the use of full precautions (N95 respira-
tors, gown, gloves, and goggles) by healthcare workers for
all patient-care activities (e.g., ward rounds, baths, wound
dressings, performance of radiologic procedures). A pow-
ered air purifying respirator should be used when perform-
ing aerosol-generating activities, e.g., chest physiotherapy.
Patients with undifferentiated fever or pneumonia should
be placed in single rooms that meet generally accepted
guidelines for the isolation of infected persons (11).
Establishing an explanation for the fever (e.g., a positive
blood culture) in a person with a contact history should not
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Figure 1. A, radiograph on admission; B, radiograph on day 5 of
hospital stay; C, radiograph on day 7 of hospital stay.
Figure 2. Radiograph on day 11 of hospital stay (day 14 after con-
tact with a SARS patient).necessitate removing the patient from isolation when a
SARS outbreak is ongoing. A detailed contact history
should include the travel history of the patient and his fam-
ily members, as well as of their medical condition, and a
much broader definition of contact is necessary, e.g., being
in a hospital in which a SARS outbreak occurs. Tests for
the SARS-CoV may be ordered, but their low sensitivity
must be considered when deciding on the patient’s dispo-
sition.
Extreme measures, such as regarding all patients with
respiratory infections as potential SARS cases, have also
been advocated in other studies (12). Nebulizer therapy
has been banned in many institutions in Hong Kong, and a
protocol for delivering inhaled bronchodilators without
nebulization to patients with asthma has been implement-
ed in Singapore General Hospital. Issues, such as bed
availability, will need to be weighed against the need to
keep patients in isolation rooms. The number of patients
that can be cared for will also be lower. The SARS out-
break has focused attention on hygiene standards in our
hospitals. Asymptomatic or pauci-symptomatic cases are
the norm with most viral infections. With SARS, such
patients may still be highly infectious. Infection control
measures are needed to prevent similar clusters of infec-
tions in the future. 
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